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Sammendrag 
Vi studerer hvordan ulike regler for tildeling av utslippskvoter kan påvirke kraftmarkedet. Ved å bruke 
en detaljert numerisk modell for energimarkedet i Vest-Europa, viser vi at ulike tildelingsregler kan ha 
svært ulike effekter på kraftmarkedet, selv om det samlede utslippsmålet er gitt. Dette gjelder spesielt i 
tilfellet med produksjonsbasert tildeling (”output-based allocation” – OBA). OBA fører til betydelig 
høyere gasskraftproduksjon, delvis på bekostning av kullkraft og fornybar kraft, sammenlignet med 
auksjonering eller såkalt ”grandfathering”. Kvoteprisen blir nesten dobbelt så høy. Selv om kraftprisen 
blir lavere, er velferdskostnadene ved å nå et bestemt utslippsmål betydelig høyere under OBA. De 
numeriske resultatene støttes av teoretiske analyser, med enkelte nye generelle resultater. 
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1. Introduction 
Emissions trading has become the most important policy instrument for regulating emissions to air, 
with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) being the most prominent example so far.1 An 
important element in any emission trading system (ETS) is how to allocate allowances, i.e., the rights 
to emit.  
 
Traditionally, economic analyses have focused on the comparison between auctioning and (uncondi-
tional) grandfathering, pointing particularly to the following: First, both alternatives provide a cost-
effective outcome (Montgomery, 1972). Second, auctioning is generally preferred over grandfathering 
from an economic welfare perspective due to auction revenues that can be used to reduce distortionary 
taxes (Goulder, 1995). More recent literature has investigated the impacts of alternative allocation 
mechanisms, not least because of the various allocation rules applied and proposed in the EU ETS 
(see, e.g., Böhringer and Lange, 2005a,b; Fischer and Fox, 2007; Ellerman, 2008; Rosendahl, 2008; 
and Rosendahl and Storrøsten, 2011a). One main insight from this mainly analytical literature is that 
the choice of allocation mechanism not only has distributional impacts, but can also affect prices and 
quantities in the markets regulated by the ETS, and thus the cost-effectiveness of the system. 
 
In this paper we explore how various allocation mechanisms may play out in the electricity market, 
using the European market as our context. Most of the literature on allocation mechanisms so far have 
either had an analytical perspective (e.g., the cited references above), or used rather stylized numerical 
models (see below for some exceptions). Our paper is, as far as we know, the most in-depth numerical 
analysis of this issue so far. We find that the choice of allocation mechanism can indeed have 
substantial impacts on electricity prices and market shares, even if the overall emission target is held 
fixed. Moreover, the costs of complying with an emission target may increase substantially if certain 
allocation mechanisms are chosen. 
 
In particular, our numerical results suggest that allocating quotas in proportion to quantities deter-
mined by the firms themselves, such as production or installed capacity, may induce large changes in 
prices, market shares and welfare costs. This is especially true for output-based allocation (OBA), for 
which allowances are distributed in proportion to each producer’s output, using so-called allocation  
                                                     
1 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm  
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factors.2 In this case we find that the welfare costs of complying with a certain emissions target may 
increase by 70 percent relative to grandfathering (or full auctioning). This scenario is characterized by 
a much higher price of emissions and a considerable increase in the market share of gas power 
(relative to grandfathering). 
 
The model we apply is an extensive numerical equilibrium model of the Western European energy 
market (LIBEMOD, cf. Aune et al. 2008). The electricity market interacts in the model with the 
markets of other energy goods, allowing us, for example, to calculate the welfare costs of different 
scenarios. Electricity production and transmission between countries, including investments in new 
production and transmission capacity, are modeled in detail, and electricity consumption is endo-
genously determined by the price of electricity and other energy carriers. For the purpose of the 
current study, the model has been extended to incorporate alternative allocation mechanisms. We 
describe the model in more detail in Section 3. 
 
In order to better understand the numerical findings with regards to OBA, we first use a simple analytical 
model to show some general results about the effects of this allocation mechanism relative to 
grandfathering. We first demonstrate that OBA generally leads to a higher price of emissions, a result 
which is well known from earlier studies, see, for example, Fischer (2001) and Fischer and Fox (2007). 
As opposed to those two studies, we consider heterogeneous firms rather than a representative firm. 
Higher emission price is clearly most detrimental to the most emission-intensive plants, and we show 
that less emission-intensive plants will in general be better off under OBA. Moreover, we find that more 
fuel efficient plants will benefit from OBA, but only if non-fuel costs are strictly convex. If non-fuel 
costs are linear, however, output is unchanged if plants only differ with respect to fuel efficiency.  
 
One interesting insight from the analytical part is that both demand for and supply of quotas are 
declining in the price of quotas under OBA, given a fixed set of allocation parameters and the govern-
ment’s net sales of quotas (e.g., through auctioning): a higher emission price leads to lower emissions 
(thus lower demand) and lower output (thus lower supply through OBA). This has bearings on the 
government’s supply-side policy in the quota market. If the government adjusts the OBA allocation 
                                                     
2 Variants of OBA will be used in the next phase of the EU ETS (see Section 4 for details), and have also been included in 
proposed cap-and-trade systems in the U.S. (e.g., House of Representatives, 2009). Whereas the EU ETS will allocate quotas 
based on past output, most studies of OBA (including ours) assume that quotas are allocated based on current output. OBA 
has previously been analyzed numerically in both electricity market models (see below) and CGE analysis (Böhringer and 
Lange, 2005a; Fischer and Fox, 2007; Böhringer et al., 2010). Analytical studies (e.g., Fischer, 2001; Böhringer and Lange, 
2005b; Sterner and Muller, 2008; Rosendahl and Storrøsten, 2011b) have focused on e.g. price and quantity effects, first- and 
second-best allocation mechanisms, and clean technology investments. The former study is the most relevant here, and is 
further discussed below. 
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parameter, i.e., changes the number of allowances per unit output, then it must also adjust either its net 
sales of quotas or the lump sum allocation of quotas to keep up with a fixed overall emissions target. 
Hence, demand side policy must go along with a suitable supply side management. We believe this 
point has not been adequately stressed in previous OBA studies. 
 
While there are some analytical studies on the relationship between allocation mechanisms and the 
electricity market as mentioned above, only a few numerical studies exist. One such study is Neuhoff 
et al. (2006). They use power dispatch models for the UK and the European electricity market, with 
fixed demand for electricity, to examine how different allocation rules may affect CO2 emissions, 
prices of CO2 and electricity, and the generation mix. Burtraw et al. (2006) investigate the impacts of 
different allocation mechanisms in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) among North 
Eastern states in the U.S., using a simulation model of the electricity market in those states. Bode 
(2006) simulates the effects of alternative allocation schemes using a power market model with five 
different technologies and 110 power plants (located in a number of countries in different regions). 
These three studies cover some of the same issues as we focus on, but their models are not as rich as 
the LIBEMOD model, e.g., with respect to inter-fuel competition, investments in different types of 
capacity and welfare calculations. Their main findings with respect to prices and quantities (e.g., under 
OBA) are largely consistent with the results we obtain. 
 
Another strand of literature investigates the relationship between emissions trading on the one hand, 
and electricity prices and quantities on the other, either from a general perspective or in the EU ETS 
context. Yet, this literature has typically overlooked the effects of different allocation mechanisms. A 
large part of this literature has examined to what degree CO2 prices are passed on to electricity prices. 
Some studies have estimated the elasticity of the electricity price with respect to the CO2 price, finding 
that this elasticity strongly depends on the generation mix in the market.3 Other studies have estimated 
the marginal pass-through rate, i.e., the ratio of the increase in power price to the marginal generator’s 
CO2 cost. For example, Lise et al. (2010), using a short-run simulation model covering the electricity 
market of 20 European countries4, find that the marginal pass-through rate is 70-90 percent in most 
countries and scenarios considered. Econometric studies find similar pass-through rates.5 In 
comparison, our equilibrium pass-through rate (with unconditional allocation of quotas) is actually 
                                                     
3 For instance, Bunn and Fezzi (2007) for the UK, and Kirat and Ahamada (2011) for Germany and France. 
4 See Chen et al. (2008) for an earlier version of the same model. 
5 For instance, Sijm et al. (2006) for Germany and the Netherlands, Simshauser and Doan (2009) for Australia, and Fell 
(2010) for the Nordic market.  
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slightly above 100 percent. This occurs because of higher gas prices due to increased gas demand.6 
More importantly, with alternative allocation mechanisms, the pass-through rate tends to be lower, 
substantially so (at around one third) under output-based allocation. 
 
In the next section we derive some analytical results about the effects of output-based allocation. Then 
in Section 3 we describe the numerical model LIBEMOD. Section 4 lays out the various policy 
scenarios we consider and compare these with previous, current and upcoming allocation rules in the 
EU ETS. Note that although our numerical analysis is performed in a European context, the allocation 
mechanisms investigated are not a blueprint of the numerous allocation rules applied in the EU ETS. 
Instead, our aim is to examine a few distinct and frequently used, or proposed, allocation mechanisms, 
focusing on one alternative at a time. Section 5 presents the numerical results on how different 
allocation mechanisms may affect the electricity market, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. General effects of output-based allocation 
2.1. Producer behaviour 
In this section we use a theoretical model to study output-based allocation schemes. We consider a two 
sector economy where in each sector s, 1, 2,s =  there is production of a homogenous good. Let isy  be 
production in firm i in sector s. Production requires use of fossil fuels x (measured in toe); let 
( )is is isy y x=  be the production function of producer i in sector s, which is increasing and concave. 
The input requirement function (inverse function of the production function), ( )is is isx x y= , is then 
increasing and convex, and shows how much fossil fuels isx  that is required to produce isy .  
 
Use of fossil fuels generates ( )is is isx yω  units of CO2 emissions where 0isω >  is the emission 
coefficient of firm i in sector s. Let sκ  be the price of emissions in sector s. We assume that in sector 
1 emissions are regulated through tradable quotas, whereas in sector 2 an emission tax 2κ  is imposed. 
 
                                                     
6 Which power producing technology is on the margin will vary across time and across countries (both in reality and in our 
simulation model). In general the demand for all fuels will change if electricity prices and/or CO2 prices change and the 
equilibrium effects in all markets simultaneously will determine the actual pass-through rates. The effect of changes in the 
markets for natural gas tend to be the most important since the supply of natural gas is much less elastic than the supply of 
e.g. coal.  
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In sector 1 producer i is required to have 1 1 1( )i i ix yω  units of CO2 quotas in order to produce 1iy . 
Further, we assume initially that in sector 1 producer i receives (free) quotas from one source only, 
namely 0 01iyγ  tradable quotas from the government. Here, 0γ  is a parameter (decided by the 
government) and 01iy  is a pre-determined variable, here production in firm i in sector 1 in an earlier 
period. Hence, the net cost of purchasing quotas is 0 01 1 1 1 1( ( ) )i i i ix y yκ ω γ− . 
 
Finally, let sp  be the output price in sector s, and let ( )is isc y  be the costs of producing isy , which is 
assumed to be increasing and convex, see discussion below. Note that ( )is isc y  covers all costs 
associated with producing isy  except costs of emissions.  
 
Producer i in sector 1 maximizes 0 01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) )i i i i i i ip y c y x y yκ ω γ− − −  wrt. 1iy , which yields the 
well-known first-order condition 
(1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ), .i i i i ip c y x y iκ ω′ ′= + ∀  
  
According to (1), at the margin the benefit of a marginal increase in production, 1,p  should equal the 
corresponding marginal cost, 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )i i i i ic y x yκ ω′ ′+  where the second term is the net marginal 
emission cost of a unit of production. Note that 01iy  is not contained in (1), which simply reflects that 
this variable is predetermined. Hence, an increase in 0γ  will have no effect on the decision of the firm 
– it will only imply a lump-sum transfer of money from the government to the firm.7 
 
Assume, alternatively, that the firm receives quotas not only related to its past activity ( 01iy ), but also 
related to its current activity such as current production, 1iy  (output-based allocation). The number of 
quotas received (in addition to 0 01iyγ ) is 1iyγ , where γ  is a parameter decided by the government, 
common to all firms in sector 1. In this case the firm maximizes 
0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) )i i i i i i i ip y c y x y y yκ ω γ γ− − − −  wrt. 1iy , which yields the first-order condition 
(2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) ), .i i i i ip c y x y iκ ω γ′ ′= + − ∀  
                                                     
7 If producers think that future allocation may depend on current production, i.e., so-called updating (Rosendahl, 2008), the 
first-order condition will change. This possibility is not considered in our analysis.  
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In (2) the firm takes into account that increased production will lead to increased costs 
( 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )i i i i ic y x yκ ω′ ′+ ) but also to more quotas received for free ( 1κ γ− ). Hence, the net marginal 
emission cost is now “only” 1 1 1 1( ( ) ),i i ix yκ ω γ′ −  which is lower than in the previous case, 
1 1 1 1( ),i i ix yκ ω ′  see (1). In order to make the problem interesting and relevant, we assume 
( ) 0x yi i iω γ′ − >  for all firms, that is, net marginal emission cost is positive. An increase in γ  will 
have impact on the decision of the firm; marginal emission costs will decrease, and hence the firm will 
increase its production and emissions.  
 
In the other sector, referred to as the tax sector ( 2s = ), there is a tax 2κ  imposed on all emissions. 
Each firm i maximizes 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )i i i i i ip y c y x yκ ω− − , and the corresponding first-order condition is  
(3) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ), ,i i i i ip c y x y iκ ω′ ′= + ∀  
 
which is equivalent to (1). 
 
Above we have discussed the decisions of a firm. Clearly, changes at the firm level have market 
implications; if firms receive quotas according to their level of production ( 1iyγ ), and γ  increases, 
the price of quotas may change. This will lead firms to adjust inputs and outputs. Therefore, we now 
consider equilibrium effects of shifts in output-base allocation rules.  
2.2. Market equilibrium 
Below we distinguish between two policy cases; case A where emissions in each sector are fixed (and 
the price of emissions typically differs across sectors), and case B where the price of emission is the 
same in the two sectors. In both cases, total emissions in the economy are fixed. 
 
In each sector, firms produce a homogenous good and the price of the good depends on total 
production of the good represented by the inverse demand function for good s:  
(4) ( ) 0.s s is s
i
p p y p′= ≤  
 
The first-order condition for firms is given by relations (2) and (3), which for given levels of ,s sp κ  
determines the supply of the goods isy . Further, total demand for emissions n each sector is given by  
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(5) ( ),s is is is
i
D x yω=  
which are functions of ,s sp κ  through isy .  
 
In the quota sector, demand for emissions is also demand for quotas, while the total supply of quotas is: 
(6) 0 01 1 1( )i i
i
T y y gγ γ= + +  
 
where 0 01 1( )i i
i
y yγ γ+  are quotas received by firms and g is net sales of quotas from the 
government. Thus 1T  is also a function of 1 1,p κ . Equilibrium in the quota market is given by: 
(7) 1 1D T=  
 
Actual emissions in each sector, se , must equal total demand for emissions: 
(8) .s se D=  
 
Finally, total emissions in the economy, E, equal the sum of emissions in each sector:  
(9) 1 2.E e e= +  
Case A: Fixed sectoral emissions 
Below we will always treat E as an exogenous variable. With fixed sectoral emissions, both 1e  and 2e  
are de facto exogenous variables, but formally one of them will be determined from relation (9), and 
hence endogenous. Below we let 2e  be endogenous.  
 
Relations (2) - (9) determine the variables 01, , , , ,is s s sy p D Tκ γ  and 2e , given the exogenous 
variables , ,g Eγ  and 1 .e  Note that g may take “any” value (provided there is a corresponding 
equilibrium), for example, zero. Furthermore, we may alternatively let g or γ  be an endogenous 
variable and  0γ  an exogenous variable. Also note that there is no interaction between the two sectors: 
Relations (2), (4) (for 1s = ), (5) (for 1s = ), (6), (7) and (8) (for 1s = ) determine 1 1 1 1 1, , , ,iy p D Tκ  
and 0γ  given the exogenous variables , gγ  and 1 ,e  and relations (3), (4) (for 2s = ), (5) (for 
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2s = ),(8) (for 2s = ) and (9) determine 2 2 2 2, , ,iy p Dκ  and 2e for given E. Hence, a change in γ  
will have no impact on the tax sector. 
Case B: A common price of emissions  
Now there is a common price of emissions, that is,  
(10) 1 2 .κ κ κ= =  
 
Because of (10) the two sectors are now interlinked. The fourteen relations (2) - (10) determine the 
variables 1, , , , , ,is s s s sy p D T eκ κ  and
0γ , given the exogenous variables , gγ  and E.  
2.3. Equilibrium effects of changes in the allocation parameter 
We now examine how a change in γ , i.e., the output-based allocation parameter, affects the 
equilibrium. We start with the case of fixed sectoral emissions, and then examine the case of a 
common price of emissions.  
Case A: Fixed sectoral emissions 
From relations (2) and (4) we have  
(11) 1 11( , ).i iy y κ γ=  
Figur 1: Supply and demand for emissions with fixed sectoral emissions 
A 
0
1D
1
1D
0
1T
2
1T
B 
1
1T
O 
1κ
1e
1e
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Differentiation of (2) with respect to γ , using (11), gives 

1 0.iy
γ
∂
>
∂
 Moreover, by differentiating (2) 
with respect to 1κ and using (11), we can derive an expression for 

1
1
iy
κ
∂
∂
. Typically, 

1
1
iy
κ
∂
∂
 is negative, 
but if production units are “sufficiently different”, this partial derivative may be positive for some 
units. For example, units with a very low emission coefficient (ω ), and/or firms requiring only a small 
increase in the use of fossil fuels for a given increase in production ( ( )x y′ ), are candidates for a 
positive derivate.8 Below we assume that 

1
1
0,iy
κ
∂
<
∂
 for all firms. 
 
Inserting (11) into (5) and (6), and differentiating with respect to 1κ , we find how aggregate demand 
for quotas, and aggregate supply of quotas, depend on the price of quotas. Because 

1
1
0,iy
κ
∂
<
∂
 both 
demand for, and supply of, quotas are decreasing in the price of quotas. In Figure 1 we have depicted 
demand for, and supply of, quotas (for given values of g, γ0 and γ). In the figure the demand curve cuts 
through the supply curve from below. This requires that 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1
i i
i i
y yxω γ
κ κ
∂ ∂
′ <
∂ ∂  , that is, 

1
1 1
1
( ) 0ii i
yxω γ
κ
∂
′
− <
∂ , which is fulfilled under our assumption, reflecting that net marginal cost of 
emissions is positive ( ( ) 0x yi i iω γ′ − > ). 
 
In Figure 1, 01D  is the initial demand curve for quotas (emissions), 
0
1T  is the initial supply curve of 
quotas, and A is the initial equilibrium. Assume now that γ  increases. Under our assumptions, both 
demand for quotas and supply of quotas will shift upwards (

1 0iy
γ
∂
>
∂
). The shift in aggregate demand 
(from 01D  to 
1
1D ), together with the assumption of a fixed level of emissions 1,e  determine the new 
equilibrium B, see Figure 1. As seen from the figure, the price of quotas 1κ  has increased.  
                                                     
8 With two firms in sector 1, here termed 1 and 2, then for firm 1 the derivative of production wrt. the quota price 
partly depends on the term 11 11 11 21 21 21 1( ( ) ( )) ,x y x y pω ω′ ′ ′−  whereas the corresponding term for firm 2 is 
21 21 21 11 11 11 1( ( ) ( )) .x y x y pω ω′ ′ ′−  We see that for firm 1 the term will be positive if 11 11 11 21 21 21( ) ( ),x y x yω ω′ ′<  and 
could possibly dominate the negative terms in the expression for  111 /y κ∂ ∂ . 
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We now examine in more detail how the equilibrium changes due to a shift in γ . First, the demand 
curve shifts by 

1
1 1 ,ii i
yxω
γ
∂
′
∂ whereas the supply curve shifts by 

1
1( )i i
y yγ
γ
∂
+
∂  (In Figure 1, 11T  is 
the supply curve after the shift in γ ). Under our assumptions we do not know whether the shift 
(measured vertically) is larger for demand than for supply. In Figure 1 we have assumed that the shift 
in demand is smallest, which is consistent with the numerical cases in Section 5. Then the government 
has to decrease 0γ  by so much that the new supply curve ( 21T  in Figure 1) goes through B.  
 
So far we have assumed that the government’s sale of quotas is given. Assume the opposite, that is, 
the government sells or buys quotas as a response to market changes, and keeps γ0 fixed. Then g is an 
endogenous variable, and both 0γ  and γ  are exogenous. If now γ  increases, then again 01D  shifts to 
1
1D , and hence B still represents the new equilibrium. Thus, all prices and quantities are identical 
between these two cases. However, the government now has to adjust g such that 21T  goes through B. 
Hence, in Figure 1 g is decreased (instead of 0γ ). From (6) we know that the change in g, when γ0 is 
held fixed, has to equal the change in 0 01iyγ  , if g had been held fixed.  
 
The discussion above can be summarized as follows:  
 
Proposition 1: If sectoral emissions are given, and firms in the quota sector receive more quotas for 
each unit of production (γ  increases), the price of emissions increases. To reach the new equilibrium 
the government has to either change the number of free quotas related to firms’ emissions in an earlier 
period (adjust 0γ ), or change its net sale of quotas (adjust g).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the first part of Proposition 1 has been shown in previous studies 
such as Fischer (2001) and Fischer and Fox (2007). Note, however, that we assume heterogeneous 
firms, each with a concave production function. This is in contrast to the two above-mentioned studies, 
which assumed homogenous firms (modelled as a representative firm), whose unit costs are decreasing 
in their emissions rate but otherwise constant. 
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If firms are identical, an increase in γ  will not change emissions at the firm level simply because total 
emissions are given in the quota sector. Hence, also production at the firm level does not change, and 
therefore the output price (in the quota sector) is unaltered.  
 
With heterogeneous firms, an increase in γ  will affect emissions and production at the firm level, and 
therefore also market shares will change. It seems reasonable to presume that firms that are fossil-fuel 
intensive, or firms with a high emission coefficient, will, cet. par., decrease their market shares, 
reflecting that these firms will suffer the most from a higher price of quotas (which is caused by the 
increase in γ ). In Appendix A we show that in general these conjectures are correct. We assume that 
costs of production consist of two terms, fuel costs and non-fuel costs (the latter is identical across 
firms), and prove the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that sectoral emissions are given and that there are two types of firms in the 
quota sector; type 1 is more fossil-fuel intensive than type 2. Assume that firms receive more quotas 
for each unit of production (γ  increases). If non-fuel costs are linear, then production in each firm 
does not change. If non-fuel costs are strictly convex, then production in type 1 (2) firm decreases 
(increases) and total production increases. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that sectoral emissions are given and that there are two types of firms that 
differ only with respect to the emission coefficient. If firms receive more quotas for each unit of 
production (γ  increases), then production in firms with the lowest (highest) emission coefficient 
increases (decreases), and total production increases. 
 
The intuition behind Propositions 2 and 3 is straight forward. If firms receive more quotas for each 
unit of production, then demand for quotas increases and total production tends to increase. Because 
total emissions in the sector are fixed, the price of quotas increases. All firms are hurt by the raise in 
the quota price, but firms that are fossil-fuel intensive, or have high emission coefficient, are hurt the 
most. In these firms production decreases. For the other type of firm, the initial effect of a lower γ , 
which decreases marginal cost of production, dominates the (generated) effect of a higher quota price, 
that is, in these firms production increases. Finally, in the special case of linear non-fuel costs and 
identical emission coefficients (first part of Proposition 2), by construction the magnitude of the shifts 
do not differ between firms (see the Appendix), and hence production does not change.  
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Above we have examined the impact of an increase in .γ  Such an increase can also be seen as a shift 
in the regulatory system from the case of firms only receiving quotas according to their historical 
activity ( 0 0, 0γ γ> = ), to the case of firms also receiving quotas according to their current activity 
( 0 0,γ > 0γ > ). We have shown that such a transition will increase the equilibrium price of quotas, 
and will in general have impact on production if firms are heterogeneous. We now turn to the case of a 
common price of emissions.  
Case B: A common price of emissions  
I Figure 2 we have depicted the equilibrium when the imposed emission tax is set equal to the quota 
price. Figure 2 is a bath tub diagram where the length of the diagram is equal to total emissions, E. 
Emissions in sector 1, 1e , is measured from left to right, whereas emissions in sector 2, 2e , is 
measured from right to left. In the figure 01D  is the initial demand curve for quotas (emissions) in the 
quota sector, and 01T  is the initial supply curve for quotas, that is, the left side of Figure 2 is a copy of 
Figure 1. Further, 2D  is demand for emissions in the tax sector, measured from the right. Point A 
represents the initial equilibrium. Here, 01D  cuts through 2D reflecting equal marginal willingness to 
pay for increased emissions. Further, equilibrium emissions in sector 1 are 01e , and the common 
equilibrium price of emissions is 0.κ  
Figur 2: Supply and demand for emissions with common price of emissions 
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Assume now that γ  increases. Like above, the demand curve in the quota sector shifts upwards (to 
1
1D ), whereas the demand curve in sector 2 does not shift. The new equilibrium is represented by B 
where 11D  cuts through 2D . Like above, the supply curve in the quota sector will shift; first to 
1
1T  
because of the shift in γ  (not shown in Figure 2), and then to 21T . The latter shift is accomplished 
either through an adjustment of 0γ  (the number of free quotas related to firms’ emissions in an earlier 
period) or through an adjustment of g (the government’s net sales of quotas). In equilibrium, the 
supply curve 21T  goes through B in Figure 2. As seen from Figure 2, the common price of emissions 
has increased (from 0κ  to 1κ ), as has the emissions in sector 1 (from 01e  to 
1
1e ), while emissions in 
the tax sector has decreased (from 0 02 1e E e= −  to 
1 1
2 1e E e= − ) .  
 
The discussion above can be summarized by the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 4: If there is a common price of emissions in the two sectors and firms in the quota sector 
receive more quotas for each unit of production (γ  increases), the government has to either change the 
number of free quotas related to firms’ emissions in an earlier period (adjust 0γ ), or change its net sale 
of quotas (adjust g). The price of emissions increases, emissions in the quota sector increase, whereas 
emissions in the tax sector decrease.  
 
From Proposition 4 we know that use of fossil fuels decreases in the tax sector, whereas the opposite is 
the case in the quota sector. Hence, production in the tax sector will for sure decrease, whereas in the 
quota sector production at the firm level will increase if firms are identical. The case of heterogeneous 
firms is examined in Appendix A. There we show that:  
 
Proposition 5: Suppose there is a common price of emissions in the two sectors and firms in the quota 
sector receive more quotas for each unit of production (γ  increases). If there are two types of firms in 
the quota sector and these differ only with respect to the degree of fossil-fuel intensity, then the least 
fossil-fuel intensive firms increase their production, total production in the quota sector increases, 
whereas the impact on production for the other type of firm is ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 6: Suppose there is a common price of emissions in the two sectors and firms in the quota 
sector receive more quotas for each unit of production (γ  increases). If there are two types of firms in 
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the quota sector and these differ only with respect to the emission coefficient, then firms with the 
lowest emission coefficient increase their production, total production in the quota sector increases, 
whereas the impact on production for the other type of firm is ambiguous.  
 
The results in Propositions 5 and 6 are quite similar to those in Propositions 2 and 3. The exception is 
the impact on firms being fossil-fuel intensive or having a high emission coefficient. In Propositions 2 
and 3, production in these firms decreases (or is unchanged in a special case), whereas in Propositions 
5 and 6 the effect is ambiguous. The difference reflects that in the latter case emissions decrease in 
sector 2, thereby opening up for increased emissions in sector 1 because total emissions are fixed. 
3. Description of the numerical model LIBEMOD 
LIBEMOD is a numerical multi-market equilibrium model for the energy sector. Its main focus is on 
the electricity and natural gas industry in Western Europe, but it also covers markets for other fuels 
like coal and oil. The model is a synthesis of the bottom up and top-down modeling traditions. On the 
one hand it offers a detailed description of the electricity and natural gas industry in Western Europe, 
in particular production of electricity, and on the other hand it has a clear foundation in economic 
theory by deriving structural behavioral relations from well-specified optimization problems, and 
imposing that all markets should clear.  
 
LIBEMOD is well suited to analyze the impact of different allocation mechanisms for CO2 quotas 
because the model has a rich description of costs in electricity production. In the model, the responses 
of profit-maximizing electricity producers to allocation mechanisms have impacts on production and 
investment of electricity, and might also differ between electricity technologies, for example between 
coal-fired plants, gas-fired plants and renewables. LIBEMOD determines all energy quantities and all 
energy prices, and CO2 prices are also determined within the model.  
 
We now give a more detailed description of the model; see Aune et al. (2008) for a complete 
description of the model, including detailed documentation of data sources and calibration strategy. 
LIBEMOD distinguishes between model countries and other countries. In a model country, there is 
production, investment, trade and consumption of all energy goods, that is, electricity, natural gas, 
three types of coal (coking coal, steam coal and lignite), oil, and biomass. In LIBEMOD, each of 
sixteen countries in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and the United 
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Kingdom) is a model country, whereas all other countries in the world are represented mainly through 
supply of, and demand for, coal and oil.  
 
Electricity and natural gas are traded in competitive well-integrated Western European markets, using 
existing capacity in international transmission of these energy goods. These capacities will be 
expanded (in the model) if there are profitable investment opportunities. Coking coal, steam coal and 
oil are traded in competitive global markets, whereas lignite (used for emission-intensive coal-power 
production) and biomass (used to produce climate-friendly electricity) is traded in national markets 
only.  
 
There are four groups of users of energy in each model country. First, there is intermediate demand 
from electricity producers: for example, gas power producers demand natural gas. Furthermore, there 
is demand from end users: the household, industry and transport sectors, though the latter demands 
only oil products. For end users, demand is derived from a nested CES utility function with five levels. 
At the top-nest level, there are substitution possibilities between energy-related goods and other forms 
of consumption. At the second level, consumers face a trade-off between consumption based on the 
different energy sources. Each of these is a nest describing complementarity between the actual energy 
source and consumption goods that use this energy source (for example, electricity and electrical 
appliances). Finally, the fourth and fifth levels are specific to electricity in defining the substitution 
possibilities between summer and winter (season) and between day and night. Thus, except for 
electricity, energy goods are traded in annual markets. Note that the calibrated parameters of the utility 
functions differ between end users and countries. 
 
In each model country, there is production of electricity by various technologies: steam coal power, 
lignite power, gas power, oil power, reservoir hydro power, pumped storage power, nuclear power, 
waste power and wind power. Some of these are not available in all countries. There are costs related 
to electricity production: fuel costs, non-fuel operating costs, maintenance costs (related to the 
maintained power capacity), start-up costs and investment costs. The power producer obtains revenues 
either from using the maintained power capacity to produce and sell electricity, or by selling part of 
the maintained power capacity to a national system operator who buys reserve power capacity in order 
to ensure (if necessary) that the national electricity system does not break down. 
 
Power producers face some technical constraints. For example, maintained capacity should not exceed 
installed capacity. In addition, there are technology-specific constraints. For example, for reservoir 
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hydro, the reservoir filling at the end of a season cannot exceed the reservoir capacity, and total use of 
water cannot exceed total availability of water (the sum of seasonal inflow of water and reservoir 
filling at the end of the previous season). Each power producer maximizes profits subject to the 
technical constraints. This optimization problem implies a number of first-order conditions, which 
determine the operating and investment decisions of the producer.  
 
LIBEMOD distinguishes between existing power plants - those that were available for production in 
the data year 2000 - and new plants. For existing plants, the capacity is exogenously depreciated over 
time and cannot be expanded. Moreover, for each type of fossil fuel based technology, and for each 
model country, efficiency typically varies across existing plants. New plants are “built” in the model if 
such investments are profitable. For new fossil fuel based technologies, efficiency does not differ 
between the same type of plant, but differs across technologies.  
 
LIBEMOD determines all energy quantities – investment, production, trade and consumption – all 
energy prices, both producer prices and end-user prices, and also emission of CO2 by sector and 
country. 
 
LIBEMOD has been calibrated to the year 2000, imposing that the parameters should reproduce 
observed demand, costs and efficiency distributions in 2000. For markets that we assume were 
competitive in 2000, that is, the coal and crude oil markets, calibrated prices will be identical to 
observed market prices. For other good, for example, natural gas and electricity, observed prices differ 
from calibrated prices, reflecting market imperfections in 2000 whereas we impose competitive 
markets in the calibration equilibrium.9 
 
For the CES utility functions (one for each type of end-user in each model country), the parameters are 
calibrated to minimize the deviation from exogenous own-price and cross-price demand elastiticies, 
where the target values are based on literature estimates. For households, the own-price elasticities are 
in the range of -0.4 to -0.6, while for industry the range runs from -0.5 to -0.7. For each model country 
there is a load curve with four segments – one for each time period. According to our data, demand is 
typically higher in winter than in summer (heating requires more energy than cooling), and higher 
during the day than at night. For a more detailed description of LIBEMOD, including data sources, see 
Aune et al. (2008). 
                                                     
9 . The model is solved in USD2000 prices, but the model results are converted to Euro2010 using a PPP conversion rate and a 
producer price index for the Euro area (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE4) 
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4. Policy scenarios 
In the numerical analysis we will examine the effects in the Western European energy market of 
different allocation mechanisms. The four sectors in LIBEMOD are divided into two groups: The 
electricity sector and the “rest-sector” (i.e., industry, household and transport sectors). For the former 
sector we assume that all electricity producers in Western Europe are part of a common emission 
trading system (ETS). For the rest-sector we assume that each country implements a CO2-tax, which is 
either country-specific or equal across countries (more details below). We will consider the year 2010, 
which is in the middle of the Kyoto period 2008-2012, and assume throughout that the Western 
European countries as a group comply with their Kyoto targets.10 Moreover, for each country, the sum 
of emissions in the rest-sector and the allocated quotas to the ETS must equal the country’s national 
emissions target. Note that in the policy scenarios we implicitly assume that the implemented policy 
was known to investors already in the year 2000, i.e., the data year of the model. This was obviously 
not the case – the results should therefore be interpreted as potential effects around ten years after the 
announcement of the different policies. 
 
The description above has certain similarities to the actual policy situation in the EU, but there are also 
significant differences. In particular, although the electricity sector accounts for a majority of EU ETS 
emissions, the system also covers other energy producing sectors and most energy-intensive industries. 
Moreover, the EU ETS comprises all member states, not only the Western European ones. However, 
the objective of this study is not to mimic the EU ETS as such, but to get a better understanding of 
how different ways of allocating free quotas may have an influence on the electricity market. 
 
We distinguish between two alternative sets of policy scenarios, see Table 1. We assume throughout 
that there is no auctioning in the ETS, i.e., all issued quotas are allocated to the installations. For 
reasons of exposition we first present a set of scenarios corresponding to Case B in section 2 above 
(here denoted PS1), where we assume that the price of CO2 is identical across countries and sectors. 
This requires that the common CO2 tax for non-ETS sectors in all countries and the allocation factor 
for the ETS (i.e., electricity) sector are adjusted so that the ETS price equals the CO2 tax and total 
emissions across countries and sectors equal the joint Kyoto target.11 With unconditional or lump sum 
allocation of quotas (or alternatively auctioning of quotas), this outcome will be cost-effective and 
                                                     
10 As LIBEMOD does not model the energy markets of EU Member States beyond EU15, we consider the emission targets 
defined by the EU’s Burden Sharing Agreement for the EU countries.  
11 This scenario will in general not be in accordance with the Burden sharing agreement mentioned above. However, the 
agreement can be attained by an appropriate level of quota trade between the governments, which would not affect the 
outcome of our partial equilibrium model. 
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equal to a scenario with a uniform CO2-tax across all sectors and countries in Western Europe. If 
quotas are allocated differently, however, the outcome may be different. In particular, the share of 
emissions between the electricity sector and the rest-sector may depend on the chosen allocation 
mechanism. 
 
It may be difficult for policy makers to fine-tune the allocation in the way described above. Moreover, 
some could argue that the share of emissions across sectors should be held fixed, so-called sector 
grandfathering. Thus, in the second set of policy scenarios corresponding to Case A in section 2 (here 
denoted PS2), we assume that the total allocation of quotas (and thus total emissions in the electricity 
sector in Western Europe) is fixed and based on the electricity sector’s share of total emissions in the 
base year of the model (i.e., 2000). Moreover, emissions in the rest-sector in each individual country 
are also fixed and derived from base year emissions. In these scenarios, the price of CO2 will typically 
vary between sectors (and between countries for the rest-sector).12 Note that total emissions over all 
model countries and sectors are the same in PS1 and PS2. 
 
In both PS1 and PS2 we consider four alternative allocation mechanisms, see Table 1. The benchmark 
mechanism A1 is unconditional grandfathering of quotas, i.e., a variant of lump sum allocation of 
quotas. The number of quotas is proportional to the level of emissions in the base year of the model 
(2000). LIBEMOD does not specify individual installations, but distinguishes between different 
electricity technologies, and between existing and new installations. Thus, the distribution of quotas is 
technology-specific and only goes to existing installations. Note that full auctioning of quotas would 
give the same outcome as A1 in LIBEMOD, except for the distribution of income between electricity 
producers and the government.  
 
The second mechanism A2 also assumes that quotas are grandfathered to existing firms. However, 
quotas will be withdrawn from installations that shut down (i.e., do not maintain) their capacity. If, for 
example, maintained capacity of existing coal power producers in a country is reduced by k percent 
compared to the base year level, coal power producers will only receive (100-k) percent of the quotas 
they would have received if they did not shut down capacity. Obviously, this allocation mechanism 
gives increased incentives to maintain production capacity compared to the benchmark mechanism, as 
the producers lose valuable quotas if they shut down capacity. 
 
                                                     
12 Alternatively, we could assume that the CO2-price in the rest-sector is equalized across countries, e.g., realized through 
trade in quotas between member countries. The main results would not differ much from the ones in PS2 though. 
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The third mechanism A3 does not involve any grandfathering. Instead, quotas are distributed in 
proportion to current production, i.e., output-based allocation, which was examined in the analytical 
model in Section 2. As shown in Section 2, this allocation mechanism acts as an implicit production 
subsidy, and hence gives increased incentives to produce electricity. Note, however, that only fossil-
based electricity production receives quotas, in line with e.g. the EU ETS. 
 
Finally, the fourth mechanism A4 assumes that quotas are distributed in proportion to maintained 
capacity. Thus, similar to A3, mechanism A4 is connected to present activity, not to the past. This 
mechanism will give higher incentives to invest in and maintain production capacity, but not to 
produce (at least not directly). Again, only fossil-based power plants receive quotas. 
 
Comparing with the allocation rules in the EU ETS, allocation in the first two periods (2005-2007 and 
2008-2012) has varied across member states and sectors, but in general it has been a mixture of 
allocation mechanism A2 for existing installations and A4 for new installations and capacity 
expansions at existing installations.13 In the next period (2013-2020), allocation rules are mostly 
harmonized across the EU. Electricity producers will as a default no longer receive allowances, but ten 
of the new member states (EU-12 minus Slovakia and Slovenia) have got an option to allocate a 
limited number of allowances to electricity generators that have been in operation since (or had started 
to invest before) the end of 2008. The member states can then choose between allocation mechanisms 
similar to A2 or A4. Other sectors will still be given substantial amounts of free allowances (in all 
member states), using a mixture of allocation mechanisms similar to A3 and A4.14 
Table 1. Policy scenarios and allocation mechanisms 
Policy scenarios  
PS1 (Case B) Identical price of CO2 across sectors and countries  
PS2 (Case A) Total emissions in the electricity sector is fixeda  
Country specific emissions in the rest-sector are fixedb 
Allocation mechanisms 
A1 “Unconditional grandfathering” 
A2 “Conditional grandfathering” 
A3 “Output-based allocation” 
A4 “Capacity-based allocation” 
a The electricity sector’s share of total emissions is set equal to its share of total emissions in the base year. 
b The rest-sector’s share of a country’s emissions is set equal to its share in the base year. 
                                                     
13 Allocation rules have not been harmonized across EU member states, so the comparison is only an approximation. For 
instance, some countries have chosen different allocation parameters for investments in different power technologies, 
whereas others have chosen equal parameters. Note that combining A2 for existing installations and A4 for new installations 
(and capacity expansions) gives the same outcome as allocation mechanism A4 in our model simulations. 
14 Allocation to an installation will be proportional to historic production level (2007-8), but adjusted whenever the operating 
capacity is reduced or increased substantially. New installations will receive quotas in proportion to operating capacity. 
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One interpretation of our results is therefore that they may provide insight into how the links between 
the EU ETS and the power market in Western Europe may change when going from the second to the 
third period (by comparing A2 and A4 with A1). Moreover, it demonstrates how the power market 
could have been affected if electricity generators had been treated in the same way as other industries 
in the EU ETS (by considering A3 and A4). 
5. Numerical results 
5.1. Base case 2010 
Before we examine the effects of the different policies, let us take a brief look at the base case scenario 
in 2010. Remember that the model is calibrated to the data year 2000. Compared to that year, the 
model accounts for growth in demand due to economic growth from 2000 to 2010. Moreover, existing 
capacities in electricity production and transmission in 2000 are depreciated at a fixed annul rate. On 
the other hand, profitable investments in electricity production and transmission of electricity and 
natural gas are assumed to be in place in 2010.15 Still, we should not expect the base case scenario for 
2010 to be identical to the actual market situation in 2010, as there are a number of factors (including 
new policies) influencing the market that is not accounted for in the base case of the model.  
 
In the base case scenario for 2010, CO2-emissions in Western Europe are 25 percent above the joint annual 
Kyoto target for the years 2008-12. The electricity sector accounts for about one third of emissions in 
Western Europe, cf. Table 2 below. The average whole price of electricity is 40 Euro per MWh (see Table 
3), with national prices varying in the range 32-43 Euro per MWh (see the Appendix for country details). 
The average whole prices of steam coal, natural gas and oil are respectively 65, 146 and 249 Euro per toe.16 
 
Partly due to relatively low coal prices, coal power production grows substantially compared to 2000, 
see Table 4 (remember that the base case assumes no new climate policies after 2000). The market 
share of coal power is thus 37 percent in the base case. Nuclear power, gas power and hydro power 
have market shares of respectively 24, 21 and 14 percent, whereas other renewables have merely 5 
percent. Oil power is not profitable. Around one quarter of power production in 2010 comes from new 
plants, i.e., plants built after 2000. 
                                                     
15 The supply functions for gas to Europe have also been adjusted from 2000 to 2010.  
16 Coal and electricity prices in the base case scenario are quite close to actual price levels in 2010, whereas gas and oil prices 
were significantly higher in reality. Of course, in 2010 energy prices were influenced by the EU ETS, so it may seem more 
relevant to compare actual 2010-prices with the policy scenarios below. 
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5.2. Policy scenario PS1 (Case B): A common price of emissions 
Assume now that Policy scenario PS1 is implemented in Western Europe. This means that CO2-prices 
are equal across countries and sectors. Let us first consider the benchmark allocation mechanism A1 
(“Unconditional grandfathering”), which mimics the conventional assumption that quotas are allocated 
in a lump sum way. Then we see from Table 3 that the price of CO2 must be 33 Euro per tonne in 
order to comply with the Kyoto target. This is the cost-effective way of complying with the target, and 
we should expect the welfare costs to be minimized in this scenario (we return to this below). From 
Table 2 we notice that emissions in the electricity sector are reduced relatively more than in the other 
sectors, which is not surprising given the larger degree of substitutability in this sector. 
Table 2. CO2-emissions in the electricity sector and other sectors in the base case and under 
different allocation mechanisms. Policy scenario 1. Million tonnes per year 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Electricity 1,430 858 874 1,031 898 
Other sectors 2,872  2,589 2,573 2,416 2,549 
Total  4,301  3,447 3,447 3,447 3,447 
Table 3. Average wholesale prices of energy goods and uniform CO2-prices across coun-
tries/sectors under different allocation mechanisms. Policy scenario 1 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Electricity (€2010/MWh) 40 56 56 47 52 
Coal (€2010/toe) 65 57 57 57 56 
Gas (€2010/toe) 146 167 160 243 200 
CO2-price (€2010/tonne) NA 33 36 53 35 
 
The prices of electricity increase as coal and gas power plants get higher marginal operating costs due 
to the cost of emitting CO2. Even if coal and gas power producers receive quotas, they treat the quota 
allocation as a lump sum transfer as long as the allocation is unconditional. The average wholesale 
price of electricity in Western Europe increases from 40 to 56 Euro per MWh (see Table 3). The price 
increase is lowest in the Nordic countries, where the shares of coal and gas power plants are much 
smaller than in the rest of Europe.  
 
The wholesale prices of coal decrease, whereas the natural gas prices increase. The explanation is that 
the CO2-price leads to a substantial shift from coal power production to gas power and renewable 
power production, cf. Table 4. Gas power production increases despite higher operating costs due to 
the CO2-price. The reason is that the supply of CO2-free electricity is limited, and so the price of 
electricity must increase sufficiently to make gas power production more profitable than without the 
climate policy. The market share of coal power drops from 37 percent to 16 percent, whereas gas 
power and non-hydro renewable power rise to 31 and 10 percent, respectively. Investments in gas 
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power and renewable power production are increased significantly compared to the base case 
situation, while investments in new coal power capacity are no longer profitable.  
Table 4. Annual production of electricity by technologies under different allocation mecha-
nisms. Policy scenario 1. TWh (Market shares in parenthesis) 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Existing plants 2,667 (78%) 2,283 (74%) 2,336 (76%) 2,301 (68%) 1,965 (62%) 
Coal 824 (24%) 506 (16%) 531 (17%) 555 (16%) 491 (15%) 
Gas 465 (14%) 397 (13%) 424 (14%) 357 (11%) 95 (3%) 
Oil 2 (0%) - 1 (0%) 12 (0%) - 
Nuclear 831 (24%) 831 (27%) 831 (27%) 831 (25%) 831 (26%) 
Hydro 441 (13%) 441 (14%) 441 (14%) 441 (13%) 441 (14%) 
Other renew. 103 (3%) 108 (4%) 108 (4%) 105 (3%) 107 (3%) 
New plants 755 (22%) 783 (26%) 732 (24%) 1,063 (32%) 1,203 (38%) 
Coal 438 (13%) - - - - 
Gas 237 (7%) 566 (18%) 514 (17%) 940 (28%) 1,030 (33%) 
Oil - - - - - 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Hydro 22 (1%) 33 (1%) 33 (1%) 27 (1%) 31 (1%) 
Other renew. 59 (2%) 184 (6%) 185 (6%) 95 (3%) 142 (4%) 
Total  3,422 (100%) 3,066 (100%) 3,068 (100%) 3,364 (100%) 3,168 (100%) 
 
Figure 3. Maintained capacity of electricity generation by technologies under different alloca-
tion mechanisms. Policy scenario 1. GW 
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The welfare costs of this cost-effective policy are calculated to 29 Billion Euro per year, see Table 5. 
Note that we disregard environmental benefits from lower CO2 emissions in these calculations. 
Consumer surplus and non-energy producer surplus are substantially reduced (in aggregate), even if 
the increased government surplus were distributed back to these groups. On the other hand, in this 
policy alternative power producers are better off than without climate policy. The reason is of course 
the large increase in electricity prices, but also the allocation of free quotas to gas, coal and oil power 
producers who benefit most from this policy: Gas producers more than triple their profits, while coal 
producers’ profits increase by more than 150 percent. With full auctioning of quotas, both gas and coal 
producers would stand to lose, but power producers as a group would still gain as producers using 
CO2-free energy would increase their profits by 60 percent. Consumers and non-energy producers 
would still lose out even if they get the revenues from auctioning of quotas.  
Table 5. Economic welfare changes compared to Base Case. Policy scenario 1. Billion Euro 
per year 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 
Consumer and non-energy producer surplus -151 -158 -190 -152 
Power producer surplus 43 44 5 21 
Other energy producer surplus and trade surplus 3 0 22 11 
Government surplus 77 83 115 80 
Total -29 -30 -49 -40 
  
Let us now consider the effects of allocation mechanism A2, i.e., “Conditional grandfathering”. As 
explained in the previous section, the difference compared to A1 (“Unconditional grandfathering”) is 
that allocated quotas to a power plant are withdrawn if the plant does not maintain all of its capacity. 
The first order effect of this “threat” is increased incentives to maintain capacity, especially for 
existing coal power plants, which to a large degree shut down under allocation mechanism A1. Figure 
3 shows that total maintained capacity is indeed 9 percent higher under A2 than under A1. 
 
With more capacity available, production of electricity from existing plants also increases compared to 
the cost-effective outcome in A1.17 This is seen in Table 6. We notice that especially supply from old 
coal power plants increases in A2 compared to A1. This crowds out some production from new gas 
power plants, so that total production of electricity is approximately the same under A1 and A2. The 
share of coal is slightly higher in A2, whereas the share of gas is slightly lower. 
 
                                                     
17 Not all the maintained capacity is used, however. For instance, oil power capacities are maintained in all countries under 
A2, but only used in one country.  
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Consistent with almost unchanged production, the price of electricity is also almost the same in A2 as 
in A1.18 The average price of gas decreases by four percent. On the other hand, the price of CO2 
increases by about nine percent as the allocation mechanism stimulates capacity maintenance and thus 
production (as a first order effect), and so the price must increase in order to comply with the overall 
target. Moreover, the electricity sector now has a bigger share of total emissions as the higher CO2-
price reduces emissions in the rest-sector. 
 
The costs of complying with the overall emissions target increase by five percent (relative to A1) 
when the quota allocation to power plants is conditioned on maintained capacity. Consumers and non-
energy producers are worse off due to a higher CO2-tax, but this has its counterpart in higher 
government tax revenues. Gas producers lose profits as reduced gas power production leads to lower 
gas prices, whereas power plants using lignite are the main winners among power producers. The 
higher total welfare costs are due to the fact that more expensive power plants (accounting for the 
shadow costs of CO2-emissions) are employed to produce almost the same amount of electricity. The 
cost differential is moderated by the fact that there are beneficial terms-of-trade effects for Western 
Europe as whole in A2, related to lower import prices of natural gas (compared to A1). The opposite is 
the case in A3 and A4, cf. the gas prices in Table 3. 
 
The first two allocation mechanisms allocate quotas based on historic emissions. The other two 
mechanisms allocate quotas based on plants’ current activity levels, i.e., in proportion to either output 
(A3) or (maintained) capacity (A4). Consequently, the latter two mechanisms give enhanced 
incentives to respectively produce (A3) or maintain/invest in power capacity (A4) for the fossil-based 
plants that receive quotas.  
 
The first order effect of allocation mechanism A3 (compared to A1) is to increase electricity 
production in coal and gas power plants. This leads to lower electricity prices, whereas the price of 
CO2 must increase in order to comply with the overall emissions target. These price effects reduce the 
profitability of coal and gas power plants, and the higher CO2-price is clearly most harmful for (old) 
coal power producers. As a consequence, output-based allocation (A3) is most favourable for gas 
power plants, which explains why gas power increases its market share from 31 percent (under A1) to 
39 percent (under A3), cf. Table 4. This is consistent with the analytical results derived in Section 2, 
showing that the least emission-intensive producers will benefit from output-based allocation.  
                                                     
18 Both total production and the average price increase marginally, which may seem inconsistent. The explanation is that the 
average price is a weighted average over four time periods and 16 regions. Thus, the price falls in some periods/regions and 
increases in other periods/regions. 
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The increased gas power production comes from new gas power plants, whereas old gas power plants 
actually produce less than in A1. The reason is that new plants are more effective than existing plants, 
and hence emit less CO2 per unit kWh produced. The market share of coal power is about the same, as 
the effect of higher CO2-price more or less matches the effect of increased production incentives. 
Renewable electricity production drops, however, due to lower electricity prices (see below). 
Increased investments in gas power capacity crowds out investments in especially wind power 
capacity. Total power production increases by 10 percent compared to A1. The CO2-price ends up 60 
percent higher in A3 than in A1, which is also consistent with the analytical results in Section 2. 
 
As indicated already, the price of electricity is reduced even more in A3 compared to A1 and A2; in 
A3 the price of electricity is 15 percent lower than in A1. There are two reasons why the price is lower 
(and production higher) in A3 than in A2. First, A3 has the highest price of CO2, which is due to the 
strong incentives to produce and thus emit under this allocation mechanism. A higher CO2-price 
means that less emissions take place in the rest-sector, and thus more emissions are allowed in the 
electricity sector (see Table 2). Second, the emission-intensity is reduced in A3 compared to A2, as 
allocation mechanism A2 mostly favour old coal power plants, while allocation mechanism A3 mostly 
favour new gas power plants. Combined, these two factors imply that production is higher and 
electricity prices lower in A3 than in A2. 
 
The economic welfare costs of allocation mechanism A3 are significantly higher than under A1 and 
A2, i.e., 70 percent higher than under A1. This might seem counter-intuitive inasmuch as more and 
cleaner electricity is produced under A3. The explanation is that the implicit subsidy provided by the 
allocation mechanism A3 stimulates more supply from more expensive (though somewhat cleaner) 
power plants. Someone has to pay for these higher costs of supply, and we notice that the group of 
power producers is significantly worse off with this allocation mechanism despite the implicit 
production subsidy, see Table 5. Even the group of gas producers loses profits despite the large 
expansion of gas power, as new gas power plants to some degree crowd out old plants. Consumers are 
also worse off under A3 than under A1, but not if extra government surplus is distributed to the 
consumers. Then they are more or less indifferent, due to a combination of lower electricity prices and 
substantially higher gas prices (vis-à-vis A1). 
 
The last allocation mechanism A4 makes it more profitable to maintain existing capacity and invest in 
new capacity, but not necessarily to produce electricity. Still, when more capacity is available, 
production will typically also increase as the marginal cost of producing one more unit is lower when 
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investment costs are sunk. As shown in Figure 3, total power production capacity is indeed highest 
under this allocation mechanism. In particular, investments in new gas power plants are increased 
relative to all other scenarios, including A3. In addition, much more of the existing coal and gas 
capacity are maintained. 
 
From Table 4 we notice that total electricity production increases slightly compared to A1 and A2 
(grandfathered allocation), i.e., by three percent, but is lower than under output-based allocation (A3), 
which stimulates production directly. Production from new gas power plants is, however, higher under 
A4 than under A3, whereas production from existing gas and coal power plants is reduced compared 
to all other scenarios. The reduction is particularly strong for existing gas power plants. The reason is 
that increased supply from new gas power plants harms existing gas power plants (which are less 
efficient than the new ones) via three channels: Higher gas prices, higher CO2-prices, and lower 
electricity prices. 
 
The price of CO2 under A4 lies between the price level under A1 and A2. The price of electricity, 
however, is six percent lower than under A1 and A2, which is consistent with the higher level of 
production. The welfare costs are substantially lower with allocation mechanism A4 than with A3. The 
main reason is the much higher CO2 price under A3, which substantially shifts emission reductions 
from the electricity sector to the other sectors (compare with the cost-effective solution A1 in Table 2). 
Nevertheless, the welfare costs are 40 percent higher than under A1, mostly because it leads to 
excessive levels of maintained power capacity. 
 
Looking at the increase in the average electricity price (relative to base case) and the CO2-price under 
the four different allocation mechanisms, we notice that the relationship between these two varies a 
lot. Under the cost-effective allocation mechanism A1, the ratio is 0.47 tonne CO2 per MWh.19 The 
corresponding ratios under A2, A3 and A4 are 0.43, 0.13 and 0.34 respectively. This illustrates quite 
clearly that the so-called pass-through of CO2-prices into the electricity price does not only depend on 
whether coal or gas power (old or new) is on the margin, but also on the way quotas are allocated to 
the power producers, working through the multimarket equilibria, notably the markets for fuel inputs. 
With output-based allocation, the pass-through rate (0.13) is in fact only one-third of the emission 
intensity of new gas power plants (0.38 tonne CO2 per MWh), and one sixth of the emission intensity 
of new coal power plants (0.78 tonne CO2 per MWh). 
                                                     
19 (56 €/MWh – 40 €/MWh) / (33 €/ton CO2) = 0.47 ton CO2 per MWh 
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5.3. Policy scenario PS2 (Case A): Fixed sectoral emissions  
Assume now instead that Policy scenario PS2 is implemented, which means that a certain share of the 
overall emissions target is allocated to the electricity sector, irrespective of allocation mechanism. This 
share is set equal to the sector’s share of emissions in the base year, i.e., 27 percent. We notice from 
Table 2 that the share is lower than in the base case scenario of 2010 (33 percent), but it is slightly 
higher than in the cost-effective emission reduction scenario described above (PS1-A1), where the 
electricity sector accounted for 25 percent of emissions. 
 
Most of the qualitative insight reached above for policy scenario PS1, such as the differences between 
the four allocation mechanisms, carries over to PS2. Thus, we will not go into all the details here. We 
will rather highlight the main differences between PS1 and PS2, and refer the interested reader to the 
tables in Appendix B. 
 
With lump sum allocation of quotas (A1: “Unconditional grandfathering”), the price of CO2 in the 
electricity sector is about 29 Euro per tonne (see Table 6), i.e., 13 percent lower than with equal CO2-
price across all sectors (PS1-A1). On the other hand, for the other sectors the weighted average price 
of CO2 across Western Europe is 50 Euro per tonne. The explanation is of course that it is less costly 
to reduce emissions in the power sector, where more substitution possibilities are present. This is well 
known to policy makers in Europe, who seem to put more ambitious targets on this sector than on 
other sectors. Note, however, that the CO2 price for the other sectors varies quite substantially across 
countries due to different emission targets and different costs of reducing emissions (e.g., because of 
differences in fuel mix and industry structure). 
 
Under allocation mechanism A3 the CO2 price is higher in the electricity sector than in the rest of the 
economy, and we notice from Table 6 that the quota price is more than twice as high under A3 than 
under A1. In the PS2 scenarios, emissions in the electricity sector cannot increase, and thus the price 
of emissions has to increase even more under PS2-A3 than under PS1-A3. 
 
Although total emissions in the rest-sector in each country are fixed across allocation mechanisms 
(PS2), we notice from Table 6 that the average CO2 tax for these sectors is affected quite much by the 
allocation mechanism used in the electricity sector. The reason is that changes in market shares and 
prices in the electricity market affect the rest of the economy as well. In particular, as electricity prices 
fall (due to more power production) and gas prices increase (due to more gas power) under A3 and A4 
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vis-à-vis A1, end users have increased incentives to switch from fossil fuels (especially gas) to 
electricity, and thus the necessary CO2-price to attain the given emission target decreases. 
Table 6. CO2-prices under different allocation mechanisms. Policy scenario 2. €2010 per tonne 
CO2 
CO2-price A1 A2 A3 A4 
Electricity sector 29 32 60 34 
Other sectorsa  50 50 43 47 
a Weighted average over all countries. 
 
Not surprisingly, welfare costs become higher when CO2-prices are not harmonized across sectors and 
countries. Costs are increased by almost 37 percent under PS2-A1 compared to PS1-A1, see Table 7. 
In particular, consumers are worse off. On the other hand, we notice that the welfare costs under PS2-
A1 are significantly lower than under PS1-A3, i.e., choosing output-based allocation, but keeping CO2 
prices equal across sectors and regions, is more costly than letting the electricity sector pay less than 
60 percent of the CO2 price in other sectors. Furthermore, the welfare costs of PS2-A3 are only 
slightly higher than that of PS1-A3, even though the former scenario has one additional distortion 
compared to the latter scenario. One reason is that the PS1-A3 scenario not only creates distortions 
within the electricity sector, but also leads to too much emission reductions in the other sectors (cf. the 
high CO2-price under A3 in Table 3). Thus, in a way the fixed allocation between the electricity sector 
and the rest of the economy under PS2 lessens to some degree the distortions created by the output-
based allocation.  
Table 7. Economic welfare changes compared to Base Case. Policy scenario 2. Billion Euro 
per year 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 
Consumer surplus -195 -197 -180 -186 
Power producer surplus  40 42 6 21 
Other prod.surplus 3 1 26 11 
Government surplus 112 114 97 106 
Total -39 -40 -51 -49 
6. Conclusions 
The main insight from this paper is that the choice of allocation mechanism, i.e., how to allocate 
emission quotas to firms regulated by an emission trading system (ETS), can have substantial price 
and quantity effects. Moreover, the welfare costs of reaching a fixed emission target may increase 
significantly if certain allocation mechanisms are chosen. Although our numerical analysis applies to 
the electricity sector of Western Europe, the qualitative insight has relevance also for other regions and 
other industries. 
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Whenever the allocation of quotas is conditioned on firms’ activity in some way or another (e.g., level 
of production or maintained capacity), firms’ incentives vis-à-vis this activity are changed. Typically, 
this activity is stimulated, usually resulting in higher production and emissions. As long as the overall 
emission target is fixed, the price of quotas is then driven up. The product market (in our case the 
electricity market) is also affected, but the impacts on this market depend highly on the choice of 
allocation mechanism. Some allocation mechanisms favour old over new installations, whereas others 
favour less emission-intensive over more emission-intensive technologies. For instance, we find that 
output-based allocation of quotas (A3) may significantly strengthen the substitution from coal power 
to gas power. Furthermore, capacity-based allocation (A4) may boost investments in new gas power 
plants. 
 
In general, allocation mechanisms that lead to large deviations from the cost-effective outcome with 
regards to prices and quantities also imply much larger welfare costs of reaching a fixed emission 
target. This is especially true for output-based allocation. Choosing this allocation mechanism can in 
fact be more costly for society than having considerably different CO2-prices across sectors. 
 
The numerical model we have used is a static equilibrium model, and hence allocation of quotas has 
been linked to current activity in our analysis. Allocation of quotas in the EU ETS, however, is to a 
large degree linked to past activity. However, as the base year for allocation has been regularly 
updated (e.g., allocation to industry installations in the years 2013-20 will be based on installations’ 
production in 2007-8), firms may think that higher activity today may provide more free quotas in the 
future. If so, the allocation mechanisms analyzed within our static model framework is merely a 
simplification of the actual allocation mechanisms, and firms’ incentives are changed in similar ways 
in the real world as in the model. However, both uncertainty about future allocation mechanisms and 
discounting of future benefits could imply that the model overstates the differences between the 
allocation mechanisms if allocation is linked to past instead of current activity. On the other hand, 
uncertainties about future allocation rules may generate additional distortions. 
 
As explained above, the electricity sector will as a general rule no longer receive quotas in the EU 
ETS from 2013, but most of the new member states (EU-12) will nevertheless continue to allocate 
quotas to their power installations. Our welfare results may provide some indications about the 
benefits of departing from free allocation to this sector, or alternatively, the costs of continuing this 
practice. Note, however, that the allocation mechanism used for this sector in the EU ETS is not the 
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most costly one in our analysis (A3), but rather a mixture of two others (A2 and A4). On the other 
hand, with different allocation rules across countries, additional inefficiencies may arise.  
 
The remaining sectors of the EU ETS will still receive substantial amounts of quotas, using a mixture 
of allocation mechanism A3 and A4. Our analysis may suggest that this could be quite costly for the 
EU compared to pure auctioning. However, the objective of free allocation to these sectors is to 
prevent carbon leakage (cf. Böhringer et al., 2010). Thus, it is difficult to judge in general whether the 
extra costs showing up in our analysis are higher or lower than the eventual benefits of reduced 
leakage. Still, our results suggest that free allocation of quotas to sectors with little or no carbon 
leakage is suboptimal. 
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Appendix A 
Assume that there are two types of firms in the quota sector. To simplify notation, we consider only 
two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, but all results carry over to the case with several identical firms of type 1 
and several identical firms of type 2. Let 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )i i i i ic y z y q x y= +  where 1q  is the (per 
assumption) common price of fuels (USD/toe) for firms in sector 1. To simplify, we assume that firms 
have the same non-fuel cost function, 1( )iz y , which is assumed to be increasing and convex. Because 
1 1( )i ix y  is increasing and convex, see discussion above, also the cost function 1 1( )i ic y  is increasing 
and convex.  
 
Below we assume that firm 1 uses at least as much fossil fuels as firm 2 in order to attain a specific 
production level, that is, 11 1 11( )x x yα=  and 21 1 21( )x x y= , where 1.α ≥  Thus, 
11 11 11 1 1 11( ) ( ) ( )c y z y q x yα′ ′ ′= +  and 21 21 21 1 1 21( ) ( ) ( )c y z y q x y′ ′ ′= + . In the discussion below we will 
examine two sources of heterogeneity; either that the input requirement differs between the two firms 
in sector 1 ( 1α > ), that is, firm 1 is more fossil-fuel intensive than firm 2, or that the emission 
coefficient differs between firms in this sector, that is, 11 21.ω ω>   
 
As noted in Section 2, relations (2), (4) (for 1s = ), (5) (for 1s = ), (6), (7) and (8) (for 1s = ) 
determine 1 1 1 1 1, , , ,iy p D Tκ  and 
0γ  given the exogenous variables , gγ  and 1 ,e In fact, relations (2), 
(4) (for 1s = ), (5) (for 1s = ), (7) and (8) (for 1s = ) determine 1 1 1 1, , ,iy p Dκ  and 1T  given the 
exogenous variables , gγ  and 1 ,e whereas 0γ  is then determined from (6). Taking this observation 
into account, we first differentiate (5) (for 1s = ) wrt.γ , which gives us a relationship between 11dy
dγ
 
and 21
dy
dγ
: 
(12) 11 21 1 21 21
11 1 11
( ) .
( )
dy x y dy
d x y d
ω
γ ω α γ
′
−
=
′
 
 
Next, we substitute (4) (for 1s = ) into (2) and then differentiate (2) wrt. γ , and finally replace 11dy
dγ
 
with (12). The derived system of equations then has the form  
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(13) 
21 1
1
21 1
1
dy dA B
d d
dy dC D
d d
κ
κ
γ γ
κ
κ
γ γ
+ = −
+ = −
 
 
where 11 1 11( ( ) ) 0B x yω α γ′= − − < , 21 1 21( ( ) ) 0D x yω γ′= − − <  and 
21 1 21
21 1 21 1 21 11 1 11 1 11
11 1 11
( )( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( )) 0.
( )
x yC A z y q x y z y q x y
x y
ω
κω κω α
ω α
′
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′
− = − + + − + + <
′
 
 
Solving (13) we find  
(14) 21 1 1 11 1 11 21 1 21( ) ( ( ) ( )) .dy B D x y x y
d AD BC AD BC
κ κ ω α ω
γ
′ ′− − +
== =
− −
 
 
In order to find the sign of 21
dy
dγ
 we need to know the sign of .AD BC−  We know from Proposition 
1 that 1 0d
d
κ
γ
> . From (13) we find that 1 1( ) /( )
d C A AD BC
d
κ
κ
γ
= − − . Hence, the sign of AD BC−  
must equal the sign of ,C A−  which is negative, see right after (13). Hence, AD BC−  is negative.20  
 
From (2) we have  
(15) ( ) ( )1 11 1 11 11 1 21 1 21 21( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).q x y z y q x y z yκω α κω′ ′ ′ ′+ + = + +  
 
Assume first that emission coefficients do not differ between firm 1 and firm 2 ( 11 21ω ω ω= = ), and 
that 1.α >  Consider first the special case of 1( ) 0iz y′′ = , i.e., linear non-fuel costs.
21 From (15) we 
then find 
(16) 1 11 1 21( ) ( ).x y x yα ′ ′=  
 
                                                     
20 As an alternative strategy to find the sign of ,AD BC− one can simply use the expressions for A, B, C and D. Tedious 
calculations reveal that 0.AD BC− <  
21 Although here referred to as a special case, we believe that linear non-fuel costs may be just as realistic as strictly convex 
non-fuel costs in the electricity sector; the numerical equilibrium model LIBEMOD, which is used in Section 5, has linear 
non-fuel costs in the electricity sector. 
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Using (14) we find that 21 0,dy
dγ
=  and thus 11 0dy
dγ
=  from (12). A marginal increase in γ  shifts, cet. 
par., the marginal cost curve of firms 1 and 2 downwards by the same magnitude ( 1κ ), and hence the 
relative position of the two firms do not change. The shift in γ  leads to a higher quota price 1κ  (see 
above), which will shift the marginal cost curves upwards, but again the two shifts are identical, 
reflecting relation (16). Thus, in the new equilibrium production at the firm level has not changed. 
This proves the first part of Proposition 2. 
 
Next, assume that non-fuel costs are strictly convex (when emission coefficients do not differ between 
firm 1 and firm 2 and 1α > ). From (15) it then follows that 21 11y y>  and thus 21 11( ) ( )z y z y′ ′> . 
Consequently, we must now have 
(17) 1 11 1 21( ) ( ).x y x yα ′ ′>  
 
Using (14) under restriction (17), we find 21 0dy
dγ
> , and thus 11 0dy
dγ
<  from (12). Hence, with strictly 
convex non-fuel costs, the most efficient firm increases its production whereas production in the least 
efficient firm decreases, which is consistent with our conjecture. In this case, the marginal cost curve 
of the inefficient firm shifts more upwards than the marginal cost curve of the efficient firm when the 
price of quotas increases, reflecting 1 11 1 21( ) ( ).x y x yα ′ ′>  Finally, using (12) we find the effect on total 
production in the quota sector: 
(18) 1 11 21 11 1 11 21 1 21 21
11 1 11
( ) ( ) .
( )
dy dy dy x y x y dy
d d d x y d
ω α ω
γ γ γ ω α γ
′ ′
−
= + =
′
 
 
In the present case the nominator in (18) equals 1 11 1 21( ( ) ( ))x y x yω α ′ ′− , which is positive under (17). 
Hence, 1 0.dy
dγ
> This concludes the proof of the last part of Proposition 2. 
 
We now consider the case of different emission coefficients and 1.α =  Assume that 11 21ω ω> , that 
is, also in this case firm 1 is the “inefficient” one. From (15) it then follows that 21 11,y y>  and thus 
1 21 1 11( ) ( )x y x y′ ′>  and 21 11( ) ( )z y z y′ ′≥  (equality if the non-fuel cost function is strictly convex). We 
then rewrite (15) and impose 1:α =  
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(19) 1 1 11 1 21 11 21 1 21 1 21 11 1 11( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )).q x y x y z y z y x y x yκ ω ω′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − = −  
 
From the discussion above we know that the left hand side of (19) is negative, and hence the right 
hand side of (19) also has to be negative: 
(20) 21 1 21 11 1 11( ) ( ).x y x yω ω′ ′<  
 
Thus in the present case the nominator in (14) is negative and the nominator in (18) is positive. Hence, 
21 0dy
dγ
>  and 1 0.dy
dγ
>  Finally, using (12) we have 11 0dy
dγ
< . This concludes the proof of Proposition 
3.  
 
We now turn to the case of a common price of emissions in the two sectors. This case is defined by 
relations (2) - (10), see discussion above. In order to find the equilibrium effects of a shift in γ , we 
first use (10) to replace 1κ  and 2κ  with .κ  Next, combining (5) - (9) and differentiating wrt. γ  we 
find  
(21) 
21 2
21 1 21 2 2
11
11 1 11
( )
.
( )
dy dyx y x
dy d d
d x y
ω ω
γ γ
γ ω α
′ ′− −
=
′
 
 
Next, substituting (4) (for 2s = ) into (3) and differentiating, we find a relationship between 2dy
dγ
 and 
d
d
κ
γ
, which is then substituted into (21): 
(22) 
2
21 2 2
21 1 21
11 2 2 2 2
11 1 11
( )( )
.
( )
dy x dx y
dy d P c x d
d x y
ω κ
ω γ κω γ
γ ω α
′
′
− −
′ ′′ ′′
− −
=
′
 
 
We then substitute (4) (for 1s = ) into (2) and differentiate, and then use (22) to substitute for 11dy
dγ
. 
The resulting system of equations has the same form as (13), but with different coefficients; , ,A B C  
and .D  We find that  
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(23) 
2
2 2 1 1 11
11 1 11 21 1 21
21 11 1 11 2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))
( )( )( )  
x q x yx y x y
dy x y P c xB D
d AD BC AD BC
ω κω
ω α ω
ω α κωκ
κ
γ
′ ′′+
′ ′
− + +
′ ′ ′′ ′′
− −−
= =
− −
 
 
Further, using (22) we find that the effect on total production in the quota sector 1 11 21( )y y y= +  is 
(24) 
2
21 2 2
11 1 11 21 1 21
1 11 1 11 2 2 2 2
11 1 11
( )( ( ) ( ))
( )( )
( )
dy x dx y x y
dy d x y P c x d
d x y
ω κ
ω α ω γ ω α κω γ
γ ω α
′
′ ′
− −
′ ′ ′′ ′′
− −
=
′
 
  
In order to sign the denominator in (23), we use the same type of argument as in the case of fixed 
sectoral emissions: Solving the system of equations we find 1 1( ) /( )
d C A AD BC
d
κ
κ
γ
= − − . From 
Proposition 4 we know that this derivative is positive. Moreover, it can be shown that 0C A− <  and 
hence 0.AD BC− <  
 
We now consider the different cases of heterogeneous firms. Assume first that emission coefficients 
do not differ between firm 1 and firm 2 ( 11 21ω ω ω= = ), and that 1.α >  Consider first the special 
case of 1( ) 0,iz y′′ =  that is, 1 11 1 21( ) ( )x y x yα ′ ′= , see (16). Then the first term in the nominator of (23) 
is zero. The second term in the nominator of (23) is always negative. Because we know that the 
denominator in (23) is negative, see discussion above, we have shown that 21 0.dy
dγ
>  Further, in our 
case the first term in the nominator of (24) is zero, whereas the second term is always positive and the 
denominator is positive. Hence, 1 0.dy
dγ
>  Finally, from (22) we see that the first term in the nominator 
is negative (this is the same term as in the case of fixed sectoral emissions), whereas the second term is 
positive (this term reflects lower emissions in the tax sector, which opens up for more emissions, and 
thus more production, in firm 1). Hence, the impact on production of firm 1 is ambiguous.  
 
Next, consider the case of non-fuel costs being strictly convex when emission coefficients do not 
differ between firm 1 and firm 2, and 1α > . We then have 1 11 1 21( ) ( ),x y x yα ′ ′>  see (17). Then the 
first term in the nominator of (23) is negative, and the first term in the nominator of (24) is positive. 
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From the discussion above it then follows that 21 0dy
dγ
>  and 1 0.dy
dγ
>  Again, the impact on 
production of firm 1 is ambiguous, see (22). 
 
Finally, consider the case of different emission coefficients ( 11 21ω ω> ) and 1.α =  We then have 
21 1 21 11 1 11( ) ( ),x y x yω ω′ ′<  see (20). Like in the previous case the first term in the nominator of (23) is 
negative, and the first term in the nominator of (24) is positive. Hence, 21 0,dy
dγ
>  1 0dy
dγ
>  and the 
impact on production of firm 1 is ambiguous. This concludes the proof of Proposition 5. 
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Appendix B 
Policy scenario 1 
Table A1. Electricity (node) prices under different allocation mechanisms. Policy scenario 1. 
$/MWh 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Austria 40 55 55 48 53 
Belgium 41 56 56 47 52 
Denmark 39 53 54 45 50 
Finland 32 47 47 39 46 
France 40 56 56 48 52 
Germany 43 57 58 49 54 
Greece 42 59 59 50 55 
Ireland 39 56 56 47 52 
Italy 42 59 59 50 55 
Netherlands 42 57 57 47 53 
Norway 36 47 47 40 44 
Portugal 40 59 59 50 55 
Spain 40 59 59 50 55 
Sweden 37 49 49 41 46 
Switzerland 42 57 57 48 53 
United Kingdom 40 56 56 46 51 
Policy scenario 2 
Table A2. Average wholesale prices of energy goods under different allocation mechanisms. 
Policy scenario 2 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Electricity ($/MWh) 40 54 55 49 52 
Coal ($/toe) 65 58 58 57 57 
Gas ($/toe) 146 167 162 255 200 
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Table A3. Annual production of electricity by technologies under different allocation mecha-
nisms. Policy scenario 2. TWh (Market shares in parenthesis) 
 Base Case A1 A2 A3 A4 
Existing plants 2,667 (78%) 2,356 (75%) 2,394 (77%) 2,207 (67%) 1,977 (62%) 
Coal 824 (24%) 571 (18%) 579 (19%) 470 (14%) 504 (16%) 
Gas 465 (14%) 405 (13%) 433 (14%) 347 (11%) 94 (3%) 
Oil 2 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (0%) 12 (0%) - 
Nuclear 831 (24%) 831 (27%) 831 (27%) 831 (25%) 831 (26%) 
Hydro 441 (13%) 441 (14%) 441 (14%) 441 (13%) 441 (14%) 
Other renew. 103 (3%) 107 (3%) 107 (3%) 106 (3%) 107 (3%) 
New plants 755 (22%) 778 (25%) 726 (23%) 1,073 (33%) 1,222 (38%) 
Coal 438 (13%) - - - 22 (1%) 
Gas 237 (7%) 579 (18%) 521 (17%) 932 (28%) 1,032 (32%) 
Oil - - - - - 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Hydro 22 (1%) 32 (1%) 32 (1%) 29 (1%) 30 (1%) 
Other renew. 59 (2%) 167 (5%) 173 (6%) 113 (3%) 138 (4%) 
Total  3,422 (100%) 3,134 (100%) 3,120 (100%) 3,280 (100%) 3,199 (100%) 
Figure A1. Maintained capacity of electricity by technologies under different allocation mecha-
nisms. Policy scenario 2. GW  
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